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Abstract
The Nash equilibrium point of the transmission probabilities in a slotted ALOHA system with
selfish nodes is analyzed. The system consists of a finite number of heterogeneous nodes, each trying to
minimize its average transmission probability (or power investment) selfishly while meeting its average
throughput demand over the shared wireless channel to a common base station (BS). We use a game-
theoretic approach to analyze the network under two reception models: one is called power capture,
the other is called signal to interference plus noise ratio (SINR) capture. It is shown that, in some
situations, Braess-like paradoxes may occur. That is, the performance of the system may become worse
instead of better when channel state information (CSI) is available at the selfish nodes. In particular, for
homogeneous nodes, we analytically presented that Braess-like paradoxes occur in the power capture
model, and in the SINR capture model with the capture ratio larger than one and the noise to signal
ratio sufficiently small.
EDICS SPC-BBND, SPC-PERF
Index Terms
Game theory, Nash equilibrium, Braess paradox, random access, slotted ALOHA.
I. INTRODUCTION
The simplicity of ALOHA [1] and slotted ALOHA [2] systems proposed in the 1970s for
random access have attracted a large amount of research. From the system perspective, the
earlier works focused on the issues of average throughput and stability of ALOHA systems with
homogeneous users. That is, these works usually assumed that all users in the network have the
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2same statistical characteristics, thus only considered the macroscopic (or network-wide average)
performance. The readers are referred to [3] and the references therein for the analyses of slotted
ALOHA in fading channels with capture.
Recently, MacKenzie and Wicker [4] first considered slotted ALOHA from the user per-
spective. They assumed that there is no centralized scheduling, and each user acts selfishly to
maximize its own utility function. They then analyzed the Nash equilibrium point by game
theory [5]. Game theory is a useful tool for modeling and studying the interaction of strategic
interactions among selfish players. The most important equilibrium concept in game theory is
the Nash equilibrium (named after its inventor John Nash) at which there is no incentive for
any player to unilaterally deviate. The selfish ALOHA system is more robust and scalable for
implementation than a system with centralized control.
The analysis of [4] was extended in [6] to the case with heterogenous users whose costs of
transmission are not identical. The behavior of the network throughput at the Nash equilibria
as a function of the costs was analyzed. Unfortunately, the cost is not a parameter one can
easily control. It is determined by the relative cost of transmission as compared to the value of
a success.
Incorporating the availability of CSI into an ALOHA system, [12] investigated the Nash
equilibrium points of CSI-dependent transmission probabilities for heterogenous nodes in time-
varying channels. In that channel-aware ALOHA system, each node tries to minimize its average
transmission probability selfishly while meeting its average throughput demand to the common
base station (BS). It was shown that the feasible region of the nodes’ throughput demands in
the selfish ALOHA is equivalent to the achievable region by a system with centralized control.
Moreover, within the feasible region, exactly two Nash equilibrium points exist. This work
considerably extended the analysis of the network model by Jin and Kesidis [11].
Other related works on CSI-dependent transmission probabilities in channel-aware ALOHA
networks include [13][14][15]. In [13], the analysis of [12] under the collision model was
extended to the capture model in static channels. It was shown that while multiple Nash equilibria
may exist, one of them is uniformly preferable in the sense of minimum transmission probability.
In [14], the authors considered the network model in [12] without the backlogged assumption, and
found that, different from [12], infinitely many equilibrium points may exist with the distributed
algorithm if the slotted ALOHA is stable. A slotted ALOHA system with general multipacket
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3reception (MPR) [16][17] was considered in [15]. It was shown that, for selfish nodes to maximize
their individual utilities (including transmission and waiting costs), the structure of CSI-dependent
transmission probabilities is a threshold strategy.
The availability of CSI was used to vary transmission power rather than transmission proba-
bility in [18]. The authors of [18] derived an explicit CSI-dependent power allocation strategy
at the Nash equilibrium point in a slotted ALOHA system with capture, under the assumption
that channel gain is uniformly distributed. It was shown that as the number of nodes increases,
the system performance with the power allocation strategy at the symmetric Nash equilibrium
point approaches that with the optimal mandated power allocation strategy.
In [19], not only CSI-dependent transmission probabilities but also CSI-dependent transmis-
sion power levels were considered. Through numerical study, it was shown that the additional
allowance of CSI-dependent transmission power levels may make the system performance worse
instead of better as compared to that with only the CSI-dependent transmission probabilities [12].
This kind of counterintuitive phenomena, which demonstrate a performance degradation when
more information or resource is added to a noncooperative network, is known as the Braess
paradox, introduced by Braess in transportation network planning [10]. There are other Braess-
like paradoxes discovered in different contexts, for example, in the contexts of queueing network
[21], computer network [22][23][24][25], and wireless communication [26].
The game-theoretic approach has widely been applied in communication networks. For ex-
ample, MacKenzie and Wicker [7] showed that game theory can be applied to developing self-
configuring wireless networks. Cui, Chen and Low [8] showed a game-theoretic framework for
contention-based medium access control. Lee et al. [9] revealed the noncooperative nature of
random access from MAC reverse-engineering. They discovered that, in the current backoff-based
MAC protocol, the users are participating implicitly in a noncooperative game.
In this paper, we also consider the network model in [12]. Our work analyzes the Nash
equilibrium point of transmission probabilities in fading channels under two more general capture
models both including the collision model [12] as a special case. We also extend the analysis of
[13] for static channels to fading channels. The main contribution of our work that differentiates
it from the earlier works studying the CSI-dependent transmission probability in selfish ALOHA
[12][13][15] is that we find that Braess-like paradoxes may occur under some situations. In other
words, in some situations, the availability of CSI may degrade the performance (in terms of,
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4e.g., total power consumption, throughput, etc.). We call this phenomenon a Braess-like paradox
due to its analogy to the Braess paradox. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to
show a Braess-like paradox analytically in a random access network, and this paradox does not
occur in the collision model considered in [12]. Such a discovery is important because it was
generally believed that the additional availability of CSI should improve, at least not degrade,
the network performance.
The two capture models we consider in this paper are similar to the capture model in [20]
for static channels. Specifically, one model is called the signal to interference plus noise ratio
(SINR) capture model in which the BS receives the packet of a node successfully if the node’s
SINR is larger than the capture ratio b. When b < 1, it is possible for the BS to successfully
receive more than one node’s packets as in, for example, CDMA systems whose signal quality
can be highly increased after despreading. When b > 1, at most one node’s packet is successfully
received as in typical narrowband systems which need the SINR to be high enough to operate
properly. The other model is called the power capture model in which the BS receives the packet
of a node successfully if the node has the strongest received power which is at least 1+∆ times
stronger than the received power of every other node, where ∆ ≥ 0 models a guard zone to
counter interference.
Our work also reveals that when CSI is not available to selfish nodes, any achievable throughput
demands in the SINR capture model can be achieved by a Nash equilibrium point with its sum
of the transmission probabilities of different nodes no larger than a constant which depends
only on the capture ratio. As for the power capture model, our analysis shows that when CSI is
not available to selfish nodes and ∆ = 0 or when perfect CSI is available to selfish nodes and
∆ ≤ 1
n−1
, where n is the number of nodes in the network, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium
point for any achievable throughput demands. When ∆ = ∞, the number of Nash equilibrium
points becomes exactly two.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We formulate our random access game
in Section II. The analysis of the Nash equilibrium points and the discussion of Braess-like
paradoxes are given under the SINR capture model in Section III and under the power capture
model in Section IV. In Section V, we provide one distributed mechanism which can make the
system converge to the Nash equilibrium. The paper is then concluded in Section VI.
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5II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a wireless network where n nodes transmit at the same fixed power level PT
to a BS over a shared channel. Time is slotted, and each transmission attempt sends a packet
which occupies one time slot. The amount of information contained in a packet is fixed and is
the same for all nodes. Thus, for the brevity of analysis, the throughput is defined in terms of
the average number of successfully received packets (which is commonly used under the capture
or MPR model, e.g., [27]). All nodes are synchronized so that each transmission attempt starts
at the slot boundary.
At time slot k, the signal yk received by the BS is given by
yk =
n∑
i=1
hi,kBi,kdi,k + ηk (1)
where
Bi,k =


1 if node i transmits in time slot k
0 otherwise
,
hi,k is the channel gain between node i and the BS, di,k is the signal from node i (with
transmission power PT ), and ηk is the additive noise at the BS.
The channel gains hi,k are assumed to be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) among
all nodes, fixed within a time slot, and varying from time slot to time slot as in [12].1 For clarity
of the analysis, the channel gain of any particular node is assumed to be an i.i.d. process with
respect to time. Note that even if the channel gain of a node is merely assumed to be a stationary
and ergodic process, the results of this paper derived based on stationary strategies can be shown
1The assumption of independence among the channels of different nodes is justified if the nodes are located far apart, or when
the channels have many scatterers surrounding the nodes (e.g., in urban areas). In addition, given that the nodes communicating
with the same BS are usually in similar environments, their channels have similar characteristics. If we further assume that
there is open-loop power control to counter the long term average of the channel effects (so the nodes can have fair competition
with one another), the assumption of identical channel distributions is also justified. In that case, the transmission power will be
different for different nodes. However, this will not affect the basic assumption of the system model, which is for every node
to individually maximize its utility, and the essence of the analysis.
DRAFT
6to hold. The readers are referred to [12, Section II] for discussion on this assumption.2 It is further
assumed that, at the beginning of time slot k, node i may be able to obtain its own instantaneous
CSI zi,k, which provides an indication of the quality of the current channel between that node
and the BS. For a TDD system, the CSI may be measured by individual nodes based on the
signal from the BS (e.g., a periodic pilot signal) and the channel reciprocity. In an FDD system,
the knowledge of CSI may be obtained via feedback from the BS. Our model only assumes that
some sort of instantaneous CSI is available and does not restrict how the CSI is obtained. In
practice, instantaneous CSI may be difficult to derive from the feedback from the BS due to the
busty nature of random access which may introduce a random time lag between the time the
BS measures the CSI and the time of transmission of a node. Thus our system model is more
applicable to TDD systems. Assume the number of possible values of zi,k is xi, and zi,k belongs
to the set {zi1, zi2, . . . , zixi} with zi1 < zi2 < · · · < zixi . Here the assumption of finite discrete
(quantized) CSI is taken for convenience only, and can be relaxed. For the analysis in this paper
to hold, the only required property of the mapping from the channel gain to the CSI is that a
larger value of CSI corresponds to a higher range of absolute channel gain |hi,k|. By excluding
the CSI values observed with probability zero, we can assume that the probability of observing
each element in the set {zi1, zi2, . . . , zixi} is larger than zero. Note that the case where CSI is
not available can be seen as a special case with only one possible CSI value.
A. Two Capture Models
1) The SINR capture model: in this model, node i’s packet will be successfully received at
time slot k if SINRi,k > b, where b is the capture ratio, and SINRi,k is the SINR of
node i at time slot k given by
SINRi,k =
Bi,k|hi,k|
2PT∑
j 6=iBj,k|hj,k|
2PT +N0
(2)
2The analysis in this paper focuses on the average performance (in a time slot). When CSI is not available, given the assumption
of independence among the channels of the nodes, the correlation of individual channels with respect to time does not affect the
average performance. When CSI is available, since we assume that the CSI is instantaneous for each time slot, and proportional
to the absolute channel gain (as will be discussed later), the inaccuracy of the CSI can be attributed mainly to the quantization
error but not the estimation error due to the time variation of the channel. Thus the time correlation again does not affect the
average performance.
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7with N0 being the power of the additive noise at the BS. If we set N0 = 0 and the capture
ratio b =∞, this capture model becomes the collision model.
2) The power capture model: in this model, node i’s packet is successfully received at time
slot k if
Bi,k|hi,k|
2 > max
j 6=i
{(1 + ∆)Bj,k|hj,k|
2}, (3)
where ∆ ≥ 0. When ∆ = ∞, we have the collision model; and when ∆ = 0, we have
the perfect power capture model for which the packet with the highest received power is
always captured.
Throughout this paper, we will only consider that the channels are i.i.d. Rayleigh fading [28].
This is the most commonly used model in wireless communications in urban areas. Hence, |hi,k|2
are i.i.d. exponential random variables.
B. Noncooperative Game Formulation
In the network, each node tries to minimize its average transmission probability (or equiva-
lently, average power investment) and selfishly makes the decision whether to transmit or not
according to the current CSI, while meeting the average throughput demand (in packets per
slot), denoted ρi for node i. It is further assumed that all nodes always have packets buffered
for transmission at any time.
This system can be modeled as a noncooperative game with constraints which are the average
throughput demands. The selfish nodes are the players, and the action of a player (node) at
every time slot is to transmit or not. For generality, in order to meet any average throughput
demand while minimizing the average transmission probability, the decision whether to transmit
or not is relaxed from being deterministic to being probabilistic. To this end, an action is defined
as transmission with a certain probability. With the i.i.d. channel gain processes, we focus on
stationary transmission strategies (as in [12]) which depend on the current CSI. Thus, we let
si = (si1, si2, . . . , sixi) ∈ [0, 1]
xi denote node i’s transmission strategy such that it transmits with
probability sim (the m-th entry of si) when the CSI is zim. {si1, si2, . . . , sixi} also defines the
action space of node i. Besides the actions of transmission with certain probabilities, the other
action of node i is to adjust its transmission strategy si such that it can sustain the average
throughput demand while minimizing the average transmission probability denoted by pi. The
DRAFT
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transmission strategies in this noncooperative game to arrive at an equilibrium will be discussed
later.
Due to the constraints (average throughput demands), the average transmission probabilities
(power investments) of the nodes are nonzero (except for the trivial case with zero throughput
demand), and the interaction between nodes is through their mutual interference or competition
to have the highest received power. We now discuss the best response strategies for each selfish
node in the network.
Definition 1: A stationary threshold strategy for node i has the form si = (0, . . . , 0, sim, 1 . . . , 1).
That is, the node always transmits when the CSI is larger than the threshold zim, and never
transmits when the CSI is smaller than zim, while the transmission probability when the CSI is
zim is sim.
For example, si = (0, . . . , 0, 0.5, 1) means that node i always transmits when the CSI is the
largest one, and transmits with probability 0.5 when the CSI is the second largest one. For the
other CSI values, node i does not transmit.
We have the following proposition as in [12] that the stationary threshold strategy is the best
response transmission strategy for each node. The reason is that transmitting at higher CSI will
result in higher probability of packet success (or higher throughput), hence more power saving.
To be more specific, since the channels of different nodes are independent, for a particular
node which does not know the CSI of the other nodes, no matter at what time slot this node
transmits and what the other nodes transmission strategies are, the packet success probability
of this node will be affected by the other nodes through the average interferences they cause.
Thus, for the node in consideration, transmitting when its CSI is higher will result in higher
average SINR and hence higher success probability in the SINR capture model. With a similar
argument, transmitting at higher CSI will also result in higher success probability in the power
capture model. Since the proof is similar to that of [12, Lemma 1], we omit it.
Proposition 1: The best response transmission strategy for each selfish node in terms of
minimizing its average transmission probability (or average power investment) while meeting
the average throughput demand, is a threshold strategy under the power capture and the SINR
capture models.
Remarks:
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91) As a result of Proposition 1, we have that a threshold strategy si = (si1, si2, . . . , sixi) =
(0, . . . , 0, sim, 1 . . . , 1) uniquely determines the average transmission probability pi of node
i by
pi = simPi(m) +
xi∑
j=m+1
Pi(j) (4)
where Pi(j) is the probability of occurrence of zij for node i. Therefore, we will analyze
the Nash equilibrium in terms of pi (as in [12]) in the remainder of this paper.
2) The best response strategy for a node to adjust its average transmission probability (hence
the corresponding stationary threshold strategy) in reaction to the given strategies of the
other nodes, is to equalize the throughput achieved by the average transmission probability
with the average throughput demand (so the average transmission probability is minimized)
[12].
3) In the case when CSI is not available (equivalently, there is only one possible CSI value),
the threshold strategy of node i becomes random transmission with probability pi at every
time slot. The action space in this case (with only one possible action) is apparently
smaller than that of the case when CSI is available. In the limiting case when perfect CSI
is available (e.g., the CSI takes the exact value of |hi,k| for node i at time slot k, that
is, there are an infinite number of possible CSI values), the threshold strategy of node i
becomes transmission only if the CSI is above the threshold which is selected such that
the average transmission probability is pi. In the sequel, only the limiting cases without
CSI and with perfect CSI are considered for the brevity of analytically studying the Nash
equilibrium points and presenting the Braess-like paradoxes.
C. Nash Equilibria
Let p−i represent the vector of the transmission probabilities of all nodes except node i,
and ri(pi, p−i) represent the average throughput of node i when it transmits with probability pi
given that the other nodes transmit with probability vector p−i. For the noncooperative game
in consideration, we define the transmission probability vector p = (p1, . . . , pn) ∈ [0, 1]n as an
action profile. The utility function for node i, given that the other nodes transmit with probability
vector p−i, is defined as Ui(pi, p−i) = 1− pi (which may be seen as the power left for node i).
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We give the definition of the (constrained) Nash equilibrium point in our noncooperative game.
Definition 2: An action profile p is a (constrained) Nash equilibrium point if for all i =
1, . . . , n, we have

ri(pi, p−i) ≥ ρi
Ui(pi, p−i) ≥ Ui(p˜i, p−i), ∀p˜i ∈ {p˜i : ri(p˜i, p−i) ≥ ρi},
(5)
where ρi, the average throughput demand, defines a constraint.
Equivalently, p is a Nash equilibrium point if
pi ∈ arg min
0≤p˜i≤1
{p˜i : ri(p˜i, p−i) ≥ ρi}, ∀ i = 1, . . . , n. (6)
The above expression means that at a Nash equilibrium point p, each node i would not prefer
to deviate from its choice of transmission probability. It should be noted that our problem is a
noncooperative game with constraints, so there are additional constraints in defining our Nash
equilibrium point that differs from the conventional Nash equilibrium point.3
Since ri(pi, p−i) and the utility function are nondecreasing functions of pi when p−i is
given under both the power capture and the SINR capture models4, it follows that an average
transmission probability vector (p1, . . . , pn) (where pi ∈ [0, 1], ∀i) is a Nash equilibrium point for
the average throughput demands (ρi, . . . , ρn) if and only if it is a solution to the set of equations
ri(pi, p−i) = ρi, i = 1, . . . , n. (7)
3The throughput constraint, which is a form of quality of service (QoS) guarantee, can be incorporated into the utility function
by a step function similar to the utility function representation of the QoS in [29]. For example, we can let the utility function
be Ui(pi, p−i) = Qi(ri) · (1− pi), where Qi(ri) = 1 if ri ≥ ρi, and Qi(ri) = 0 otherwise. With this utility function, a node
which can not meet its throughput demand has utility 0. This unconstrained model is more general because it can handle the
situation where the system can not sustain all nodes’ throughput demands and some nodes will have zero utility. On the other
hand, its Nash equilibria are much more difficult to analyze because for a node that can not meet its throughput demand, taking
any transmission probability will result in zero utility, but different transmission probabilities will have different impacts on the
other nodes’ throughputs and utilities. The constrained model focuses on the case where all nodes’ throughput demands can be
met, and is more straightforward to analyze.
4This is intuitive, and can be verified by the analytical expressions of ri(pi, p−i) in (9) and (15) for SINR and power capture
cases, respectively, without CSI; and in (13) and (19) (or (21), for homogeneous nodes) for the cases with perfect CSI.
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III. SINR CAPTURE MODEL
A. Equilibrium point analysis for SINR capture
We first consider the case without CSI. In a given time slot, assuming that n nodes simulta-
neously transmit to the BS, the probability that the packet from a particular node (say, node 1)
is successfully received is given by [30]
Pr
[
|h1|
2 > b
n∑
i=2
|hi|
2 + b
N0
PT
]
=
(
1
1 + b
)n−1
e
−b
N0
PT . (8)
We first give the following lemma about the average throughput.
Lemma 1: Under the SINR capture model with capture ratio b, and i.i.d. Rayleigh fading
channels between all nodes and the BS, we have the average throughput of node i when the
transmission probability vector p = (p1, . . . , pn) and no CSI is available to all nodes:
ri(pi, p−i) = e
−b
N0
PT pi
∏
j 6=i
(
1−
bpj
1 + b
)
. (9)
Proof: Let (x1, . . . , xk) ∈ I−{y1,...,ys} denote x1 < · · · < xk, all belonging to the node
index set I−{y1,...,ys} , {1, 2, . . . , n} \ {y1, . . . , ys}, where \ denotes the set minus operator. The
throughput of node i can be computed as
ri(pi, p−i) =pi ·
∏
j∈I−i
(1− pj) · e
−b
N0
PT
+ pi ·
∑
j∈I−i

pj ∏
k∈I−{i,j}
(1− pk)

 ·( 1
1 + b
)
e
−b
N0
PT
+ pi ·
∑
(j,k)∈I−i

pjpk ∏
l∈I−{i,j,k}
(1− pl)

 ·( 1
1 + b
)2
e
−b
N0
PT
+ · · ·
+ pi

∏
j∈I−i
pj

 · ( 1
1 + b
)n−1
e
−b
N0
PT
=e
−b
N0
PT pi
∏
j 6=i
[(
pj
1 + b
)
+ (1− pj)
]
=e
−b
N0
PT pi
∏
j 6=i
(
1−
bpj
1 + b
)
.
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Definition 3: An average throughput demand vector (ρ1, . . . , ρn) is called achievable if there
is a Nash equilibrium point for it (i.e., satisfying Definition 2). The set of all achievable average
throughput demand vectors is called the feasible throughput region.
By Lemma 1, Definition 2 and Definition 3, an average throughput demand vector (ρ1, . . . , ρn)
is achievable under the SINR capture model if there exists a Nash equilibrium point (p1, . . . , pn)
such that ρi = e
−b
N0
PT pi
∏
j 6=i(1 −
bpj
1+b
), ∀i. We observe that this expression is similar to that in
[12] for the collision model, thus the following result can be easily obtained with a proof similar
to that in [12, Theorem 3]. The proof is omitted for conciseness.
Theorem 1: For the SINR capture model with capture ratio b, there are at most two Nash
equilibrium points for any achievable throughput demands (ρ1, . . . , ρn) when no CSI is available
to all nodes, and exactly one of the Nash equilibrium point can be achieved with
n∑
i=1
pi ≤
b+ 1
b
.
In the case when perfect CSI is available, i.e., the CSI takes the exact value of absolute channel
gain, the best response strategy (threshold strategy) for node i is to transmit only when its CSI
is larger than a threshold Ti. Assume that we have the Nash equilibrium point (p1, . . . , pn) for
the throughput demands (ρ1, . . . , ρn). Then Ti must satisfy
∫∞
Ti
e−xidxi = e
−Ti = pi. When there
are s nodes in the network and all of them have perfect CSI, the probability that these s nodes
simultaneously transmit to the BS, and the packet from a particular node (say, node i) gets
successfully received is∫ ∞
Ts
· · ·
∫ ∞
T1

∫ ∞
max
{
Ti, b
(∑s
j=1
j 6=i
xj+
N0
PT
)}e−xidxi

e−x1dx1· · ·e−xsdxs. (10)
This expression is very complicated due to the max{·, ·} that accounts for the situation where
the threshold Ti is already high enough to guarantee successful reception of node i’s packet.
However, if we have
b

 s∑
j=1
j 6=i
Tj+
N0
PT

 ≥ Ti, (11)
(10) can be simplified to
s∏
j=1
j 6=i
(
pb+1j
b+ 1
)
e
−b
N0
PT . (12)
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Note that in practical systems (e.g., narrowband systems for which b > 1), (11) is usually
true when s ≥ 2. (11) is satisfied except there is one particular Ti which is sufficiently larger
compared to the other Tj’s. Because the transmission probability pi is exponentially decreasing
in Ti, this implies that pi is sufficiently small compared to the other pj’s, and the throughput
demand for node i could be nearly zero. In that case, node i could be removed from the analysis
with little effect. Therefore, the extra conditions (11) on Ti’s are usually satisfied. When s = 1,
b
(
N0
PT
)
≥ Ti may not be true in many situations. Thus, using (12) only for s ≥ 2, the throughput
of node i at the Nash equilibrium is equal to the demand
ri(pi, p−i) =ρi
=
∏
j∈I−i
(1− pj) ·
∫ ∞
max
{
Ti, b
(
N0
PT
)}e−xidxi
+
∑
j∈I−i

pb+1j ∏
l∈I−{i,j}
(1− pl)

 · ( 1
b+ 1
)
e
−b
N0
PT
+
∑
(j,l)∈I−i

(pjpl)b+1 ∏
l∈I−{i,j,l}
(1− pl)

 · ( 1
b+ 1
)2
e
−b
N0
PT
+ · · ·
+

∏
j∈I−i
pj


b+1
·
(
1
b+ 1
)n−1
e
−b
N0
PT
=e
−b
N0
PT
∏
j 6=i
(
pb+1j
b+ 1
+ (1− pj)
)
+
∏
j∈I−i
(1− pj) ·min
{
pi − e
−b
N0
PT , 0
}
, (13)
where the last equality is obtained using an approach similar to the proof of Lemma 1.
To analyze the Nash equilibrium when perfect CSI is available is quite difficult due to the
complicated equation (13), so we only show the existence of Nash equilibra for the case with
homogeneous nodes. (That is, the throughput demands are (ρ1, . . . , ρn) = (ρ, . . . , ρ), the Nash
equilibrium point is (p1, . . . , pn) = (p, . . . , p), and the threshold is T for all nodes such that∫∞
T
e−xidxi = e
−T = p, ∀i.) In this case, when b ≥ 1, the throughput of a particular node at the
Nash equilibrium point can be computed by (13) as
ri(p, . . . , p) = ρ =
[
(1− p) +
pb+1
b+ 1
]n−1
e
−b
N0
PT + (1− p)n−1 ·min
{
p− e
−b
N0
PT , 0
}
. (14)
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Because dri
dp
< 0 for p > e−b
N0
PT and dri
dp
> 0 when p is sufficiently small (i.e., limp→0+ dridp > 0),
there is a particular p∗ ∈
[
0, e
−b
N0
PT
]
achieving the maximum of (14), denoted by ρmax. Therefore,
when perfect CSI is available to homogeneous nodes and given the throughput demand ρ ≤ ρmax,
there is at least one Nash equilibrium. Through simulations, we found that there are at most two
Nash equilibria even in the case with heterogeneous nodes. However, we are not able to provide
a rigorous proof.
B. Braess-like paradox for SINR capture
In this subsection, we will present analytically a Braess-like paradox for the case with homo-
geneous nodes. We have the following theorem for the interference limited situation, i.e., N0
PT
is
sufficiently small:
Theorem 2: With the same average transmission probability p (or average power investment),
the throughput of homogeneous nodes with perfect CSI is not larger than that of homogeneous
nodes with no CSI when 1 < b <∞ and N0
PT
is sufficiently small.
Proof: Since N0
PT
→ 0, we have e−b
N0
PT → 1. By Lemma 1 and (14), we need to show that
for b > 1, we have
p
(
1−
b
b+ 1
p
)n−1
≥
(
(1− p) +
pb+1
b+ 1
)n−1
− (1− p)n
⇔p
(
1−
b
b+ 1
p
)n−1
+ (1− p)n ≥
(
(1− p) +
pb+1
b+ 1
)n−1
.
Rewrite the left-hand side, and then apply Jensen’s inequality on the convex function xn−1, (x >
0), as follows:
p
(
1−
b
b+ 1
p
)n−1
+ (1− p)(1− p)n−1
≥
[
p
(
1−
b
b+ 1
p
)
+ (1− p)(1− p)
]n−1
=
[
(1− p) +
p2
b+ 1
]n−1
≥
[
(1− p) +
pb+1
b+ 1
]n−1
.
The last inequality comes from the facts that b > 1 and 0 ≤ p ≤ 1.
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This Braess-like paradox is illustrated in Fig. 1 where b = 5 and N0/PT → 0. As the figure
shows, with the same average transmission probability, the throughput of homogeneous nodes
with perfect CSI is never larger than that of homogeneous nodes with no CSI. This means that in
order to achieve the same average throughput demand ρ, homogeneous nodes with perfect CSI
need to have the average transmission probability p (the smaller solution) at the Nash equilibrium
point not smaller than that (the smaller solution) with no CSI when b > 1.
Discussion:
1) This Braess-like paradox is clearly due to the fact that, while improving a node’s received
power by transmitting when the channel is better, the threshold strategy also increases
the average interference seen by each node. As a result, the SINRs of the nodes are not
necessarily higher. Thus, if a node could refrain from taking the best response strategy and
be less selfish (e.g., by ignoring the CSI and transmitting with the same probability at all
time slots), the other nodes would benefit. If all the nodes could do the same, every node
would benefit and the performance would improve. However, for a particular node, doing
so would be against its best interest given that it does not know the channels of the other
nodes. In addition, an individual node would never be sure if the other nodes would also
be altruistic, unless a centralized regularization is applied. Thus, centralized control and/or
altruism (or cooperation) are necessary to improve the performance. How the optimal
performance can be achieved by centralized control or cooperation is an interesting topic
that needs further investigation, but is beyond the scope of this paper.
2) In general (when N0/PT is not sufficiently small), Theorem 2 cannot be applied. The
throughput comparison given the same average transmission probability depends on the
average transmission probability p, the total number of nodes n, and the capture ratio b.
Fig. 2 shows the cases with b = 5 and PT/N0 = 50. It can be seen that when n = 10
nodes, the throughput with perfect CSI is slightly higher than the throughput without CSI
when the average transmission probability is smaller than 0.05. Fig. 3 is an example with
b = 0.8 and PT/N0 = 10. It is shown that there is no Braess-like paradox.
3) When N0 = 0 and b = ∞, we have the collision model. In this case, the throughputs of
homogeneous nodes with perfect CSI and without CSI will both be p(1− p)n−1 when the
average transmission probability is p.
4) For the case with heterogeneous nodes, the conditions for the occurrence of Braess-like
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paradoxes are quite complicated and need to be analyzed case by case. Here, we present
a numerical example of a two-node network. Assume b = 5 and N0
PT
= 0.01.
• Case (i) p1 = 0.52 and p2 = 0.24: the throughput demands achievable for node 1
and node 2 without CSI availability are ρ1 = 0.3957, ρ2 = 0.129, respectively. With
perfect CSI, the throughput demands achievable for node 1 and node 2 are ρ1 = 0.3952,
ρ2 = 0.118, respectively. A Braess-like paradox occurs.
• Case (ii) p1 = 0.580 and p2 = 0.088: the throughput demands achievable for node 1
and node 2 without CSI availability are ρ1 = 0.511, ρ2 = 0.04325, respectively. With
perfect CSI, the throughput demands achievable for node 1 and node 2 are ρ1 = 0.529,
ρ2 = 0.04300, respectively. The results show that it is possible that node 2 gains while
node 1 suffers when CSI is available.
IV. POWER CAPTURE MODEL
A. Equilibrium point analysis for power capture
We first analyze the case when CSI is not available. Let the PDF and the cumulative density
function (CDF) of |hi,k|2 be f(x) and F (x), respectively. The received power Pi of node i at
time k is given by Bi,kPT |hi,k|2 where Bi,k = 1 if node i transmits at time k and Bi,k = 0
otherwise. Then the average throughput of node i is given by
ri(pi, p−i) = Pr
[
Bi,k|hi,k|
2 > max
j 6=i
{
(1 + ∆)Bj,k|hj,k|
2
}]
= pi
∫ ∞
0
∏
j 6=i
[∫ xi
1+∆
0
f(xj)dxj+(1−pj)
∫ ∞
xi
1+∆
f(xj)dxj
]
f(xi)dxi
= pi
∫ ∞
0
∏
j 6=i
[
1− pj
(
1− F
(
xi
1 + ∆
))]
f(xi)dxi
= pi
{
1−
(∑
j 6=i
pj
)∫ ∞
0
(
1− F
(
xi
1 + ∆
))
f(xi)dxi
+

 ∑
(j,k)∈I−i
pjpk

∫ ∞
0
(
1− F
(
xi
1 + ∆
))2
f(xi)dxi
− · · ·
+(−1)n−1
(∏
j 6=i
pj
)∫ ∞
0
(
1− F
(
xi
1 + ∆
))n−1
f(xi)dxi
}
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where the last equality is obtained by expanding the product terms in the integral, and the
notation (y1, y2, . . . , yk) ∈ I−i means that y1 < y2 < · · · < yk, all belonging to the node index
set I−i , {1, 2, . . . , n} \ {i}.
For Rayleigh fading channels, f(x) is the exponential function, so we have∫ ∞
0
(
1− F
(
xi
1 + ∆
))n
f(xi)dxi =
1 +∆
1 +∆+ n
.
Therefore, if (p1, . . . , pn) is a Nash equilibrium point, we have the following set of equations
for the corresponding achievable average throughput demands
ri(pi, p−i) = ρi = pi −
1 + ∆
2 +∆
∑
j∈I−i
pipj +
1 +∆
3 +∆
∑
(j,k)∈I−i
pipjpk
− · · ·+ (−1)n−1
1 + ∆
n+∆
n∏
j=1
pj, ∀i = 1, . . . , n, (15)
and the resultant total achievable average throughput demand
n∑
i=1
ρi=
n∑
i=1
pi−
2 + 2∆
2 +∆
∑
(i,j)∈I
pipj+
3 + 3∆
3 +∆
∑
(i,j,k)∈I
pipjpk
− · · ·+ (−1)n−1
n+ n∆
n+∆
n∏
i=1
pi, (16)
where the notation (y1, y2, . . . , yk) ∈ I means that y1 < y2 < · · · < yk, all belonging to the node
index set I , {1, 2, . . . , n}.
Example 1 (∆ =∞): The set of equations for a Nash equilibrium point become ρi = pi
∏
j 6=i(1−
pj), i.e., the case ∆ =∞ corresponds to the collision model, and there exist exactly two Nash
equilibrium points for any throughput demands within the feasible region [12].
Example 2 (∆ = 0): For the special case where ∆ = 0, i.e., perfect power capture model, we
have
ρi = pi −
1
2
∑
j∈I−i
pipj +
1
3
∑
(j,k)∈I−i
pipjpk
− · · ·+
(−1)n−1
n
n∏
j=1
pj , (17)
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and the total achievable average throughput demand
n∑
i=1
ρi =
n∑
i=1
pi −
∑
(i,j)∈I
pipj +
∑
(i,j,k)∈I
pipjpk
− · · ·+ (−1)n−1
n∏
i=1
pi
= 1−
n∏
i=1
(1− pi). (18)
The following theorem shows that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium point:
Theorem 3: Under the perfect power capture model (∆ = 0) with no CSI available to
all nodes, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium point for the average throughput demands
(ρ1, . . . , ρn), ρi ≥ 0, ∀i, if and only if
n∑
i=1
ρi ≤ 1
Proof: In Appendix A.
In the case when perfect CSI is available to all nodes, a particular node i will transmit only
when its CSI is larger than a threshold Ti. Ti must satisfy
∫∞
Ti
f(xi)dxi = e
−Ti = pi, where pi
is the average transmission probability of node i, and f(·) is the exponential PDF for Rayleigh
fading channels. The average throughput of node i can be computed as
ri(pi, p−i) =
∫ ∞
Ti
∏
j 6=i
[∫ Tj
0
f(xj)dxj+
∫ max{ xi1+∆ , Tj}
Tj
f(xj)dxj
]
f(xi)dxi
=
∫ ∞
Ti
∏
j 6=i
[
max
{
1− pj, 1− e
−
xi
1+∆
}]
f(xi)dxi. (19)
This expression depends on the specific values of the thresholds (hence the average transmission
probabilities and the average throughput demands) of individual nodes.
In the following, we will only consider the case with homogeneous nodes. Let the throughput
demands be (ρ, . . . , ρ) and the Nash equilibrium point (p1, . . . , pn) = (p, . . . , p). When CSI is
not available to all nodes, from (15) we have
ri(p, . . . , p) = ρ = p−
(
n− 1
1
)
1 + ∆
2 +∆
p2+· · ·+(−1)n−1
(
n− 1
n− 1
)
1 + ∆
n +∆
pn. (20)
In the case when perfect CSI is available to all nodes, a node will transmit only when its
CSI is larger than a threshold T . T must satisfy
∫∞
T
f(x)dx = e−T = p, where p is the average
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transmission probability. For this case, denote the average throughput demand achievable at the
Nash equilibrium point (p, . . . , p) as ρ′. We have
ri(p, . . . , p) = ρ
′ =
∫ (1+∆)T
T
[∏
j 6=i
∫ T
0
f(xj)dxj
]
f(xi)dxi
+
∫ ∞
(1+∆)T
[∏
j 6=i
∫ xi
1+∆
0
f(xj)dxj
]
f(xi)dxi
=
[
p(1− p)n−1(1− p∆)
]
+
[
p1+∆ −
(
n− 1
1
)
1 + ∆
2 +∆
p2+∆
+ · · ·+ (−1)n−1
(
n− 1
n− 1
)
1 + ∆
n +∆
pn+∆
]
. (21)
The Nash equilibrium can be analyzed as follows when perfect CSI is available to homoge-
neous nodes. From (21), we have dri
dp
= (1− p)n−2
[
1− np + (n− 1)p1+∆
]
, and
d
dp
(
1− np+ (n− 1)p1+∆
)
= −n + (n− 1)(1 + ∆)p∆. (22)
Note that 1 − np + (n − 1)p1+∆ = 1 if p = 0, and 1 − np + (n − 1)p1+∆ = 0 if p = 1. We
consider two cases: 0 ≤ ∆ ≤ 1
n−1
and ∆ > 1
n−1
separately in the following.
• Case (i) 0 ≤ ∆ ≤ 1
n−1
: From (22), 1 − np + (n − 1)p1+∆ is a decreasing function for
p ∈ [0, 1], so dri
dp
≥ 0 when 0 ≤ ∆ ≤ 1
n−1
. This means that ri is an increasing function in
p, so there exists a unique Nash equilibrium point if the throughput demand is achievable
under the case 0 ≤ ∆ ≤ 1
n−1
.
• Case (ii) ∆ > 1
n−1
: 1− np + (n− 1)p1+∆ has a minimum at p∗ =
[
n
(n−1)(1+∆)
] 1
∆
∈ (0, 1),
and 1 − np + (n − 1)p1+∆ is decreasing in (0, p∗) and increasing in (p∗, 1). Therefore,
1 − np + (n − 1)p1+∆ has exactly two zeros z1, z2(= 1) in [0, 1]. It follows that dridp ≥ 0
in [0, z1] and dridp ≤ 0 on [z1, 1]. In other words, ri increases to the maximum ρ
′
max when
the transmission probability p is from p = 0 to p = z1 and then decreases when p > z1.
This means that there exist at most two Nash equilibrium points if the throughput demand
is achievable (i.e., ρ′ ≤ ρ′max) under the case ∆ > 1n−1 .
B. Braess-like paradox for power capture
We present analytically a Braess-like paradox for the case with homogeneous nodes by the
following theorem.
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Theorem 4: With the same average transmission probability p (or average power investment),
the achievable average throughput demand of homogeneous nodes with perfect CSI is not larger
than that of homogeneous nodes without CSI under the power capture model.
Proof: We want to show ρ′ ≤ ρ, where ρ′ and ρ are given in (20) and (21), respectively.
We have
ρ′ =(1− p∆)p(1− p)n−1 + p∆ρ
≤max{p(1− p)n−1, ρ}
≤ρ,
where the first inequality is deduced from the convex combination of p(1−p)n−1 and ρ, and the
second inequality is due to the fact that p(1− p)n−1 equals to the throughput for ∆ =∞ (when
CSI is not available) and the throughput decreases as ∆ increases. The proof is complete.
Similarly, this theorem implies a Braess-like paradox that for the same achievable average
throughput demand ρ, homogeneous nodes with perfect CSI have the average transmission
probability p (or average power investment) at the Nash equilibrium point not smaller than
that of the case without CSI.
V. DISTRIBUTED ALGORITHMS
In a network, each node can usually estimate its average throughput through, for example, the
acknowledgement of successful packet reception from the BS. Let ρˆi denote node i’s throughput
estimate. We can set node i’s initial (i.e., at the 0th iteration) transmission probability pi(0) = ρi,
as the transmission probability needs to be at least ρi to fulfill the throughput demand. We provide
one most common distributed mechanism converging to the Nash equilibrium point. The readers
are referred to [8][14][12] for more discussions on the use of various distributed algorithms to
achieve the equilibrium points in random access games.
At the (m+ 1)th iteration, each node updates its transmission probability by
pi(m+ 1) = pi(m) + ǫ(m)
[
min
(
1,
ρi
ρˆi(m)
pi(m)
)
− pi(m)
]
,
where the step size ǫ(m) > 0. Usually, ǫ(m) ≤ 1, for example, ǫ(m) = 1
1+m
and a smaller ǫ(m)
will more likely ensure the convergence to the better Nash equilibrium point (i.e., ∑ pi ≤ b+1b )
under the SINR capture model, and to the unique Nash equilibrium under the power capture
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model. However, it also takes a longer time for convergence. When CSI is available, the threshold
Ti(m+1) can be uniquely determined from pi(m+1) and vice versa if the channel characteristics
are known. Note that the time between two consecutive iterations of a node does not have to
be the same as that of the other nodes. The nodes can update their transmission probabilities
synchronously or asynchronously.
Issues such as infeasible throughput demands, and the design tradeoff of ǫ(m) between
ensuring convergence and the convergence time, are beyond the scope of this paper.
We present some simulation results in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5, where the channels are i.i.d. Rayleigh
fading, and the reception model is SINR capture. We consider a three-node network with
throughput demands ρ1 = 0.10, ρ2 = 0.05, ρ3 = 0.01, the capture ratio b = 5, and PTN0 = 10. The
cases with no CSI and perfect CSI are considered, and node i estimates its ρˆi by the number
of successfully transmitted packets divided by number of time slots that have elapsed. For the
case with no CSI, the dynamic of the transmission probabilities is plotted in Fig. 4. For the case
with perfect CSI, we have the threshold Ti(m + 1) = − ln pi(m + 1), and node i will transmit
only if its channel gain is larger than the threshold Ti. The dynamic of the thresholds is plotted
in Fig. 5. Three realizations are shown for each case, and the figures illustrate that they indeed
converge to the same equilibrium.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we used a game-theoretic approach to study the Nash equilibrium point of
CSI-dependent transmission probabilities for selfish random access nodes in fading channels
with capture. The analysis revealed that under the power capture and SINR capture models,
there are at most two Nash equilibrium points in the feasible region of throughput demands.
For the collision channel, which is a special case of both the power capture and SINR capture
models, there are exactly two Nash equilibrium points within the feasible region. On the other
hand, there is one unique Nash equilibrium point under the perfect power capture model when
CSI is not available to selfish nodes. Our work extends the existing works in the literature.
Moreover, we pointed out that, in some situations, performance degradation may occur when
CSI is available to selfish random access nodes as compared to when CSI is not available. We
called this phenomenon a Braess-like paradox. In particular, we analytically showed that for
homogeneous nodes, Braess-like paradoxes occur in the power capture model and in the SINR
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capture model with the capture ratio larger than one and noise to signal ratio sufficiently small.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 3
We need to show that for any throughput demands (ρ1, . . . , ρn) satisfying ρi ≥ 0 and
∑n
i=1 ρi ≤
1, there is a unique solution (p1, . . . , pn) called the Nash equilibrium point. That is, the repre-
sentation (17) is a one-to-one and onto mapping from the unit n-cube (0 ≤ pi ≤ 1) to the unit
n-simplex (ρi ≥ 0 and
∑n
i=1 ρi ≤ 1).
In the following, we simply use
∑
i to denote
∑n
i=1 and a similar expression for
∏
j . Consider
the auxiliary function G
G(p1, . . . , pn) =
∑
i
ρi ln pi +
∫ 1
0
[∏
j(1− pjx)
]
− 1
x
dx. (23)
It can be checked that the solution of the set of equations (17) is a critical point of this function.
We first show that the representation (17) maps the open cube (0 < pi < 1) one-to-one and onto
the open simplex (ρi > 0 and
∑n
i=1 ρi < 1), and then deal with the boundary.
Let pi = eti . We will show that G is a strictly concave function of variables ti as long as
all ti < 0 (correspondingly, 0 < pi < 1). This is equivalent to showing that the Hessian of
G is positive semi-definite (or nonnegative definite), that is, ∑i,j ∂2G∂ti∂tj hihj < 0. Let Φ(x) =
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∏
j(1− pjx) and ψi(x) =
pi
1−pix
, we have the following equation:∑
i,j
∂2G
∂ti∂tj
hihj
=
∑
i 6=j
∂2G
∂ti∂tj
hihj +
∑
i
∂2G
∂t2i
h2i
=
∫ 1
0


(∑
i
hiψi(x)
)2
−
∑
i
h2iψ
2
i (x)

 xΦ(x) dx
+
∑
i
∫ 1
0
(
−h2iψi(x)Φ(x)
)
dx
=
∫ 1
0
[∑
i
hiψi(x)
]2
xΦ(x) dx
−
∫ 1
0
∑
i
h2i (ψi(x) + xψ
2
i (x))Φ(x) dx. (24)
By Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we have[∑
i
hiψi(x)
]2
≤
[∑
i
h2iψi(x)
]
·
[∑
i
ψi(x)
]
. (25)
Hence, all we need is to show that∑
j
h2j
∫ 1
0
ψj(x)
[∑
i
ψi(x)
]
xΦ(x) dx
−
∑
j
h2j
∫ 1
0
(
ψj(x) + xψ
2
j (x)
)
Φ dx < 0,
which is true if for all j we have∫ 1
0
ψj(x)
[∑
i
ψi(x)
]
xΦ(x) dx≤
∫ 1
0
(
ψj(x)+xψ
2
j (x)
)
Φ(x) dx,
or, equivalently, ∫ 1
0
ψj(x)
[∑
i 6=j
ψi(x)
]
xΦ(x) dx ≤
∫ 1
0
ψj(x)Φ(x) dx. (26)
Let Φj(x) =
∏
i 6=j(1− pix) and Φ′j(x) = ddxΦj(x). The inequality (26) can be rewritten as
pj
∫ 1
0
−xΦ′j(x) dx ≤ pj
∫ 1
0
Φj(x) dx
⇔ pj
∫ 1
0
xΦ′j(x) + Φj(x) dx = pj [xΦj(x)]
1
0 = pjΦj(1) > 0,
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which is obvious.
Hence, we know that the function G is strictly concave in ti when all ti < 0. It follows that
there is at most one critical point in the open unit cube and that point is the point of maximum.
This takes care of the one-to-one part.
As for the onto part, we only need to show that for (ρ1, . . . , ρn) satisfying ρi > 0 and∑n
i=1 ρi < 1, the maximum is attained inside the cube, not on the boundary (i.e., some pi = 1).
Note that the maximum cannot be attained with any pi = 0 (then G = −∞). Hence, ∂G∂pi ≥ 0
at the point of maximum whether it is on the boundary or not (otherwise slightly shifting the
point to the left will result in a bigger value). Thus,∑
i
∂G
∂pi
≥ 0
⇒
n∑
i=1
ρi ≥ 1−
n∏
i=1
(1− pi),
where we have use the equality (18). Since the left hand side is smaller than 1, we cannot
have any pi = 1 at the point of maximum, and thereby we have proved that the open cube is
one-to-one and onto mapped to the open simplex.
Now, we look at the boundary issue. The representation (17) is a continuous function, and
the unit cube is compact, so the image has to be compact. The onto claim is done.
It is clear that if ρi = 0, we must have pi = 0. So, removing all zeroes, we can reduce the
problem to itself with fewer variables. That is, we only need to consider all ρi > 0. Note that
in (25) we have the equality only when all hi are the same (the only direction in which we
may lack strict concavity). Hence, if there are two critical points, both points cannot be on the
boundary simultaneously, and one has to be inside the cube. Once one of them is inside the cube,
we immediately get
∑n
i=1 ρi < 1, no critical point on the boundary at all then. In conclusion,
we have at most one critical point. The one-to-one claim is done, and the proof is complete.
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Fig. 1. n homogeneous nodes with perfect CSI and no CSI at the Nash equilibrium point under the SINR capture model with
the capture ratio b = 5 and N0/PT → 0.
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Fig. 2. n homogeneous nodes with perfect CSI and no CSI at the Nash equilibrium point under the SINR capture model with
the capture ratio b = 5 and PT /N0 = 50.
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Fig. 3. n homogeneous nodes with perfect CSI and no CSI at the Nash equilibrium point under the SINR capture model with
the capture ratio b = 0.8 and PT /N0 = 10.
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Fig. 4. Dynamic of transmission probabilities in a three-node network with no CSI under the SINR capture model. The capture
ratio b = 5, PT
N0
= 10, and the throughput demands are ρ1 = 0.10, ρ2 = 0.05, ρ3 = 0.01.
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b = 5, PT
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= 10, and the throughput demands are ρ1 = 0.10, ρ2 = 0.05, ρ3 = 0.01.
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